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Judy Fudge*

Labour Rights as Human Rights:
Turning Slogans into Legal Claims

What does it mean to say that labour rights are human rights? What is the role of
the courts in transforming a political manifesto into a legal claim? The answers
to these questions are developed in three parts. The first places the rights to
organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike in the social and political context in
which they are claimed, contested, and recognized. The second part examines
what it means to say that labour rights are human rights with an eye to teasing out
the significance of this characterization. Third, the role of the courts when it comes
to making the maxim that labour rights are human rights a legally enforceable right
is assessed by focusing on what it means to say that courts should be neutral
in interpreting the freedom of association contained in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedom in the labour context.

Qu'entend-on quand on dit que les droits du travail sont des droits de la
personne? Quel est le r6le des tribunaux dans la transformation d'un manifeste
politique en revendication legale? Les reponses a ces questions sont elaborees
en trois parties. Dans la premiere, Iauteureplace le droit d'association, le droit a
la negociation collective et le droit de greve dans le contexte social et politique
ou ils sont revendiques, contestes et reconnus. Dans la deuxieme partie, elle
se demande ce que signifie affirmation que les droits du travail sont des droits
de la personne, afin d'en extraire tout le sens. Enfin, dans la troisieme partie,
elle examine le r6le des tribunaux lorsqu'il faut transformer cette affirmation en
droit juridiquement executoire. A cette fin, elle se demande ce que veut dire,
dans le contexte du droit du travail, la declaration que les tribunaux doivent 6tre
neutres dans leur interpretation de la liberte d'association prevue dans la Charte
canadienne des droits et libertes.

*
Kent Law School, University of Kent. This paper was initially presented as the Fourth Annual
Innis Christie Lecture, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University on 3 October 2013. I would like
to thank both the Faculty of Law and the Christie family for their invitation and for their hospitality.
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Introduction
Innis Christie began his prolific career as a researcher and scholar by
publishing a comparative study of the liabilities of strikers in the law of
torts in England and Canada.1 In what was his master's thesis, he examined
whether or not, and, if so, the extent to which, the courts' elaboration
of the common law took the legitimate interests of trade unionists into
account when deciding upon liabilities and remedies for harms caused in
the context of strikes. He was interested in seeing how judges deployed
common law rules and reasoning where picketing was typically involved.
By comparing Canada with England, he could assess the role of courts
in two different labour law contexts. In Canada, promotional legislation
supported collective bargaining, whereas in the U.K. the dominant
approach, called collective laissez-faire, was not to enact statutory rights
to support collective bargaining but, instead, to provide trade unions with
immunity from common law actions brought by employers in the context
of industrial disputes.
Innis adopted an historical and comparative approach to his account
of the development of tort doctrine in the U.K. and Canada as it pertains
to workers' and trade unions' collective industrial action. He began his
study by noting how, from their origins in the late eighteenth century
in England during the crucible of laissez-faire capitalism, trade unions,
which are organizations that depend upon combined action, did not fit
into a framework that emphasized individualism and competition. Under
that system, he described how "workers were regarded as individual
units of labour power which, in the capitalist system, were to be priced in
accordance with the laws of supply and demand. When workers combined

1.

IM Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort: A Comparative Study of the Law in

England and Canada(Kingston, ON: Queen's University, Industrial Relations Centre, 1967).
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against an employer they interfered with those laws."2 He explained how
these economic ideas were translated into legal rules by judges who were
drawn from the ruling elite.
Innis concentrated on how, despite the widespread social acceptance
of trade unions and legislative support for collective bargaining in the
mid-1960s in Canada, courts continued to develop new common law
heads of liability-new torts-for trade unions and their members who
engaged in collective action. Referring specifically to the 1963 decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein,3

which involved union members picketing a retailer in order to put pressure
on a supplier to enter into a collective agreement, he complained that the
"political maxim of a 'right to trade' had been elevated to the 'status of a
legal rule.' 4 He dissected the legal niceties by which judges were able to
ignore the interests of trade unions and in doing so revealed how economic
and legal ideologies combined to restrict collective action by workers.
Innis's solution to this bias or tilt in the common law was to call upon
judges to be neutral in their treatment of employers and trade unions.
These conflicts between employers and unions were best resolved by the
parties in a framework to be established by legislatures and not in the
courts. In this prescription, he shared the view of his thesis supervisor,
Bill Wedderbum, that in the battle between the legislature and the courts
over who gets to define the scope of permissible collective trade union
6
action, labour's best bet was with politicians and not with judges.
Like Innis, I am very interested in the process by which the courts
transform a political maxim into a legal right. Where I differ from him
is that I am intrigued by the "rights" which conflict with the right of
employers to trade. These are the collective rights of labour to associate
in trade unions, to bargain collectively, and to go on strike. In this paper,
I will examine the slogan "labour rights are human rights" and consider
the extent to which it has been turned into a legal claim. I am particularly
keen on considering what it means to say that judges and courts should be
neutral in this process.

2.
3.

Ibid at 2.
(1963), 38 DLR (2nd) 449 (Ont CA). For a discussion of Hersees in its social and historical

context, see Eric Tucker "Herseesof WoodstockLtdv Goldstein: A Small Town Case Makes it Big" in
Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds, Work on Trial: CanadianLabourLaw Struggles (Toronto: Irwin Law

and the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal Hsitory, 2010) 217.
4.
Christie, supra note 1 at 188.
5.

Ibid at 188, 194-195.

6.
KW Wedderburn, The Worker andthe Law (London: Pelican, 1965) and the review of that book
by Christie, (1966) 44 Can Bar Rev 163.

604

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Essentially I am interested in two questions. What does it mean to
say that labour rights are human rights? What is the role of the courts in
transforming a political manifesto into a legal claim?
In order to answer these questions I will do three things. I will begin
by contrasting the labour relations landscape and climate as it was in the
mid-1960s when Innis Christie wrote and published his monograph with

the situation as it is today, almost 50 years later. Rights are not timeless, but
can only be understood in their context.8 Thus, it is essential to historicize
the labour rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike, to place
them into the social and political context in which they were claimed,
contested, and recognized. The legal validity of a rights claim is dependent
upon the social processes through which rights claims are fought for and
institutionalized in law. 9 Second, I will examine what it means to say
that labour rights are human rights. Here my concern is to tease out the
significance of characterizing labour rights as human rights. Third, I will
assess the role of the courts when it comes to making the maxim that labour
rights are human rights a legally enforceable right by focusing on what it

7.
It will become clear in this paper that I am neither a legal positivist nor an adherent of natural
law (even of the weak Lon Fuller variety). I do not believe that there exist "right" answers to legal
questions, just answers that are more or less plausible in light of what are generally considered to be
valid legal sources and forms of argument. I do not believe that there is an over-arching normative
"narrative" to labour law in particular or liberal law in general. Instead, I believe that there is a limited
universe of contested positions that vie for dominance at particular moments in time in specific
places. Nor do I believe that there is an innate and immanent "legal" grammar that can be discerned
and that will provide a "correct" answer to every legal question. While Lon Fuller's thin version
of natural law, which emphasizes the constraints of "legality," is experiencing something akin to a
revival, see, for example, Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudenceof Lon L
Fuller (Oxford: Hart, 2012), legal theories are contentious, and there are several plausible accounts
(including realist, positivist, pluralist, and constructivist accounts) on offer. It is methodologically
suspect to defend a particular approach to interpreting a constitutional provision by asserting, and
not justifying and defending, a legal theoretical position. It is equally unsound, although perhaps
more persuasive, to use analogies (that legal anatomy is like human anatomy, for example) instead
of arguments to establish a position. Thus, my position is very different from that endorsed by Brian
Langille & Benjamin Oliphant, "The Legal Structure of Freedom of Association," at 6-8 provided
to me by the Dalhousie Law Journal, 23 September 2014. The version I was provided with differs
in detail, but not substance, from the version available online: SSRN <http://papers.ssracom/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2355976>.
8. The approach to rights that I am adopting is expressed in Judy Fudge, "Making Claims for
Migrant Workers: Human Rights and Citizenship" (2014) 18:1 Citizenship Studies 29. For atypology
of different approaches to rights, see Marie-Benedict Dembour, "What Are Human Rights? Four
Schools of Thought" (2010) 32 Hum Rts Q 1.
9. In his review of Wedderburn's The Worker and the Law, Innis (supra note 6 at 164) quoted
Wedderburn's admonition, "But technical law by itself is useless, at best an arid game played by keen
minds in court rooms and academic ivory towers. To understand its significance we must look at its
historical and social setting, we must question what are the values and policy judgments enshrined
within the propositions of law...." I have taken this advice to heart.
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means to say that courts should be neutral in interpreting the freedom of
association contained in the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedom in
the labour context.
I. Then and now
Innis Christie published his first monograph, The Liability of Strikers in
the Law of Tort, in 1967, which marked the dawning years of the golden
age of industrial citizenship. 0 Industrial citizenship, which comprised the
freedom of association, the right to representation and collective bargaining,
and the right to strike, was the crowning achievement of industrial
pluralism. The legal foundation for industrial citizenship is specific to
each nation, since how its key components are institutionalized is shaped
by the interaction of economic, political, and social forces over time.11 In
Canada, industrial citizenship took an industrial pluralist form,12 and it was
embodied in a particular model of collective bargaining legislation, called
Wagner-style.13 This model, which was developed in the U.S. in the 1930s
and adopted in Canada in the 1940s, has three key components: exclusive
trade union representation of workers in a defined constituency on the
basis of a majority vote, the duty on employers to bargain in good faith
with the union that had won exclusive bargaining rights, and the right to
strike to determine the contents of collective agreements. The legislation
marked a rupture from the individualism of the common law, although it
did not replace the common law. Industrial pluralism was layered on top
of the common law, which continued both to operate in tandem with the
statutory regime, especially when it came to workers' collective action,
14
and to influence the interpretation of the legislation.
What is distinctive about this legislative model of freedom of
association is the degree to which the law regulates the relations between
the parties and the extent to which restrictions on the freedom to strike

10. HWA Arthurs, "Developing Industrial Citizenship A Challenge for Canada's Second Century"
(1967) 45:4 Can Bar Rev 786.
11. Bob Hepple & Bruno Veneziani, The TransformationofLabour Law in Europe:A Comparative
Study of 15 Countries (Oxford and Portland: Hart, 2009).

12.

For a succinct discussion of the difference between pluralist and corporatist forms of collective

bargaining see Guy Mundlak, Fading Corporatism: Israels Labor Law and Industrial Relations
(Ithaca: ILR Press, 2007) at 13-15, 227-240.

13.

The Wagner-model refers to collective bargaining that is patterned after the American National

Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 USC § 159-161; Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law:
The Regulation of Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900 to 1948 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford

University Press, 2001, republished University of Toronto Press, 2004).
14. Fudge & Tucker, ibid. The idea of separate zones of common law and collective bargaining fails
to ignore how the former influenced and permeated the later.
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were traded off for rights to bargaining and to strike.15 While it worked
well in the sectors for which it was designed-large employers in mass
production and large resource industries-this model also created barriers
that proved difficult for unions to overcome in order to organize sectors
dominated by many small employers or the private service sector more
generally.16
In the 1960s, about one in three workers was a member of a union. 7
But union membership was confined almost exclusively to the private
sector, and the vast majority of members were men in primary blue-collar
manufacturing, resource extraction, or transportation jobs. Civil servants
were prohibited from joining unions in order to protect state sovereignty,
and workers in the broader public sector-hospitals and schools for
example-did not have the necessary legal support to make freedom of
association real.
In 1966, the number of workers engaged in strikes peaked, and the
upsurge in militancy had two effects. 8 First, it unleashed a third wave
of unionization in Canada, which was fuelled by public sector workers.
Second, governments across the country appointed several expert task
forces to study the industrial conflict and advise on possible solutions. The
federal Woods Task Force, for which Innis Christie co-wrote an important
background study on unfair labour practices, diagnosed the cure to the
problem of labour unrest as strengthening the institutions of industrial
pluralism, especially the powers of labour boards.1 9 The idea was to
minimize the vestiges of the common law and the courts from the regulation
of labour relations, and the judiciary was told to defer to the expertise of
the boards. Employers' common law freedoms were restricted, although
they were never completely displaced. There was widespread public as
well as political support for trade unions and collective bargaining, and
union membership spread in the 1970s, peaking in the early 1980s."

15. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, "The Freedom to Strike: A Brief Legal History" (2010) 15 CLELJ
333.
16. Judy Fudge, "The Gendered Dimension of Labour Law: Why Women Need Inclusive Unionism
and Broader-Based Bargaining" in Linda Briskin & Patricia McDermott, eds, Women Challenging
Unions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 321.
17. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, "Pluralism or Fragmentation?: The Twentieth-Century Employment

Law Regime in Canada," (2000) 46 Labour/Le Travail 251 at 282.
18.

Ibid at 283.

19.

Canada, Task Force on Labour Relations, (HD Woods, Commissioner) (Ottawa: Privy Council

Office, 1968); Innis Christie & Morely Gorsky, Unfair Labour Practices:An Explanation of the
Efficiency of the Law of Unfair Labour Practicesin Canada, report prepared for the Task Force on

Labour Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968).
20.

Fudge & Tucker, supra note 17.
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Almost fifty years later, while about one-third of Canadian workers
are union members, there has been a remarkable shift in membership
from the private to public sector. While private-sector membership has
fallen, public-sector membership has climbed. In 2012, only 17.7 per cent
of private sector employees were union members, in contrast to 73 per
cent union membership in the public sector. Moreover, Statistics Canada
calculates that person-days lost to strikes and lockouts declined by almost
87 per cent between 1980 and 2010.21
Opinion polls indicate that most Canadians regard unions as "selfinterested and that gains for organized labour are a detriment to the economy
as a whole." 22 Since the economic crisis began in 2008, public sector unions
have become a target for criticism and legislative restriction. 23 Republican
politicians in some heavily indebted states in the United States targeted
unions as the cause of their problems. In Wisconsin, much-publicized and
greatly contested legislation stripped most public union workers of the
right to collectively bargain over everything except wages. Ohio went even
further in interfering with workers' rights by making it illegal for public
sector workers to strike. 24 While such a full-scale attack on public sector
unions has not yet occurred in Canada, the federal government imposed
21. Richard Littlemore, "Do unions have a future?" The Globe and Mail (27 March 2013), online:
The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/do-unionshave-a-future/articlelo310754/?page-all>; Althia Raj, "Conservative War On Unions: As Public
Service Job Cuts Mount, Tories Distract, Destabilize Critics" (26 September 2012) Huffington
Post, online: Huffington Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/09/25/conservative-union-billscanada n 1910888.html>.
22. Mario Canseco, a vice president withAngus Reid Public Opinion, said most Canadians surveyed
in May 2012 believed unions wield too much power, a sentiment that crossed all age groups and
gender. Forty-nine per cent of those surveyed said unions had too much influence, while 26 per cent
felt unions had just the right amount of influence and 16 per cent said unions had not enough influence,
according to the poll of 1,003 Canadians, with a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points,
see Raj, supra note 21.
23. "The battle ahead: Confronting the public-sector unions" The Economist (6 January 2011),
online: The Economist <www.economist.com/blogs/multimedia/20 11/01 /confrontingjpublic-sector
unions>. The Economist singled Canada out for attention; in the Canadian public sector union density
has increased from 12 per cent in 1960 to more than 70 per cent today. "(Government) workers of
the world unite!" The Economist (6 January 2011), online: The Economist <www.economist.com/
node/17849199>.
24. Anne Marie Lofaso, "In Defense ofPublic-Sector Unions" (2011) 28 Hofstra Lab & Emp LJ 301.
See also the special issue "Public Sector Collective Bargaining Under Challenge Symposium" (2011)
28 Hofstra Lab & Emp LJ 253; Paul M Secunda, "The Perceptible Disconnect between the Global
Economic Crisis and the WisconsinPublic Sector Labor Dispute of 2011," 27 November 2011, online:
SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract->; Konrad Yakabuski, "Battle Rages over Ohio's union-limiting law"
The Globe andMail (29 October 2011) A8. In November 2011, Ohio voters resoundingly rejected this
legislation Sabrina Tavemise, "Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting Unions' Rights" New York Times
(8 November 2011), online: New York Times <www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/politics/ohio-tumsback-a-law-limiting-unions-rights.html>.
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wage restraints on its public sector workers and, on two occasions in 2011,
it introduced legislation prohibiting workers employed by private-sector
airlines and the crown-owned postal service from striking and imposed
25
interest arbitration to settle the disputes.
The new economy has produced distinctive patterns of winners and
losers when it comes to the types of jobs, wages, benefits, and working
hours that the labour market generates. 26 One of the consequences
of deregulation has been to downgrade the norm for new jobs for all
labour force participants. 2 Precarious work and inequality undermine
the sustainability of households and create fissures and tensions in the
social fabric, which, in turn, undermines social cohesion. The decline in
union density is linked to increasing labour market inequality in Canada
and other countries. 28 Our old labour laws do not fit the new reality of
the private sector-small workplaces, different groups of workers, and a
29
variety of different types of jobs.
If unions and collective bargaining are simply confined to the public
sector, the political support for unions, collective bargaining and strikes
will continue to evaporate, and governments will continue to be free
either to let legal support for freedom of association at work atrophy or to
outright revoke it.

25. In June 2011, the federal government announced that it would legislate an end to a sixteen-hour
private sector strike between Air Canada and its employees. The government introduced Bill C-5,
ContinuingAir Services for PassengersAct, 1st sess, 41st Parl, 2011 for First Reading on 16 June
2011. However, the parties negotiated a settlement before the legislation was passed. Only four days
later, it introduced legislation, Bill C-6, Restoring Mail Deliveryfor CanadiansAct, SC 2011, c 17,

forcing locked-out postal workers back to work. Bill C-6 was introduced for First Reading on 20 June
2011 and Royal Assent was received on 26 June 2011. See the discussion in Derek Fudge, "Labour
Rights: A Democratic Counterweight to Growing Income Inequality in Canada," in Fay Faraday, Judy
Fudge & Eric Tucker, ConstitutionalLabourRights in Canada:Farm Workers and the Fraser Case

(Toronto: Irwin, 2012) 234.
26. Judy Fudge, "The New Workplace: Surveying the Landscape," (2009) 33:1 Man LJ 131.
27.

Ibid.

28. Michael Lynk, "Labour Law and the New Inequality" (2009) 59 UNBLJ 14; Lane Kenworthy &
Jonas Pontusson, "Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries" (2005)
3:3 Perspectives on Politics 449.
29. See Cynthia Cranford, Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker& Leah Vosko, Self-Employed Workers Organize:
Law, Policy, and Unions (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 2005). I have discussed this
problem in "Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the
Scope of Labour Regulation" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 609; "After Industrial Citizenship: Market
Citizenship or Citizenship at Work?" (2005) 60 Relations Industrielles 631; "Beyond Vulnerable
Workers? Towards a New Standard Employment Relationship" (2005) 12 CLELJ 145; "Feminization
and Fragmentation: The Challenge of Equity for Labour Market Policy" in Janine Brodie, ed, Women
and Public Policy in Canada(Toronto: HBJ, 1995) 57.
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II. Labour rights as human rights
In this climate, it is understandable why trade unions argue that labour
rights are human rights, and, therefore, not subject, without review, to the
winds of political appeal and popular support. A core component of the
project to recast labour standards as international human rights is to elevate
their moral appeal. Accompanying this shift in discourse is the change in
institutions for protecting labour rights from the traditional vehicles such
as the welfare state, social democratic parties, and trade unions to legal
instruments like constitutions and the courts.3
In Canada, the campaign to have labour rights recognized as human
rights operates at two levels-the international and the national, which
have become linked through constitutional litigation.3 1
At the international level, since 1919 the International Labour
Organization has treated workers' freedom to associate in trade unions as
a fundamental component of social justice. 32 After World War II, freedom
of association was also protected in the Universal Declarationof Human
Rights. The rights contained in the Declaration were divided into two
covenants, the InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights, which
contained individual rights against the state, and the InternationalCovenant
for Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, whose rights require positive
state action.33 Although the two covenants have been seen as protecting
different generations or types of rights (civil and political, on the one hand,
and economic and social on the other), freedom of association is protected
in both instruments.34 In 1998, the International Labour Conference issued
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which
identifies freedom of association and the effective recognition of collective

30.

Judy Fudge, "Brave New Words: Labour, the Courts and The Canadian Charter of Rights and

Freedoms," (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 23.
31.

Ibidat35.

32.

Gerry Rodgers, Eddy Lee, Lee Swepston & Jasmien Van Daele, The InternationalLabour

Organizationand the Questfor SocialJustice,1919 2009 (Geneva: International Labour Organization,
2009) at Chapter 1. See also Francis Maupain, The Future of the InternationalLabourOrganization in
the Global Economy (Oxford: Hart, 2013).

33. Traditionally, civil and political rights are considered to be justiciable, whereas social and
economic rights are regarded as programmatic and subject to progressive implementation.
34. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, GA Res 2200A (XXi), 21 UN GAOR,
(Supp No 16) 52, UN Doc A/6316, 99 UNTS 171 (16 December 1966); InternationalCovenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights,GARes 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR, (Supp No 16) 52, UN
Doc A/6316, 993 UNTS 3 (16 December 1966). The only labour rights specifically protected within

the Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights are the protection against slavery and servitude and the
freedom of association (Articles 8 and 22). By contrast, most labour rights-such as the right to work
and decent remuneration-were included within the economic and social rights covenant (Articles 6,
7 and 8).
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bargaining as core human rights. At the international level it is clear that
labour rights are considered to be human rights.35
Beginning in the early 1980s, when industrial citizenship first came
under concerted attack, Canadian unions have lodged complaints at the
ILO against governments across Canada for violating their freedom of
association.3 6 Despite the success ofthe union complaints,3"the observations
by ILO supervisory bodies that Canada is in violation of its commitment to
protect workers' freedom of association have had little direct effect of the
behaviour of Canadian governments. Because ILO observations are soft
law, governments can ignore them with impunity.
It is, however, possible to give international instruments and
observations indirect legal effect by invoking them before constitutional
courts in order to assist judges in interpreting fundamental rights in
constitutional instruments that provide individuals with access to judicial
review of state and private action. Freedom of association is a central
component of many constitutions that protect civil and political rights.
How should Canadian courts treat international human and labour
rights in interpreting similar provisions in the constitution? What is the
normative justification for courts to refer to these legal norms? When a
court relies on international instruments to interpret a constitutional right
is it stepping on the toes of the executive, which has the exclusive power
to ratify treaties? These are important questions, which I cannot delve into
now.38 However, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided an answer to
the first; it stated that the "Charter should be presumed to provide at least

35. Judy Fudge, "Labour Rights as Human Rights: Social Justice for Workers in Globalizing World,"
Faculty of Law Research Day, University of Law, Lund University, 4 June 2014, available from the
author.

36.

Judy Fudge, "The New Discourse of Labour Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?"

(2007) 29:1 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 29.
37. Derek Fudge, Collective Bargaining in Canada: Human Right or Canadian Illusion? 2nd

revised ed (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2007).
38. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Patrick Macklem, "The International Constitution"
in Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, ConstitutionalLabourRights in Canada:Farm Workers and the Fraser
Case (Toronto: Irwin, 2012) 261.
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as great a level of protection as is found in human rights documents that
39
Canada has ratified.1
Taking this proposition as his baseline, Kevin Banks argues that
relevant ILO instruments and their interpretation create a human rights
framework for the right to collective bargaining that imposes no particular
model of collective bargaining. In effect, this framework deploys "a set
of largely negative obligations of non-interference and non-impairment,
supplemented by limited obligations to prevent and provide remedies for
interference by private actors."40
In Canada, the Supreme Court has on several occasions been asked
to interpret the freedom of association contained in the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms as protecting labour rights to bargain collectively
and to strike. Instead of reviewing the court's answers,41 what I want to
focus on in my concluding section is what the role of the court should be
in giving the claim that labour rights are human rights legal effect.
III. The role of courts: labour rights as legal claims
In order to answer this question, we first need to be clear about what is
at stake when constitutional courts like the Supreme Court of Canada are
asked to interpret the freedom of association to include labour rights and
why it is so contentious.
From the perspective of a constitutional court there are two problems
with labour rights. First, they trouble the boundary between civil and
political rights on the one hand and social and economic on the other.42 In
common law jurisdictions, simply prohibiting states from interfering with
workers' association is not enough. Meaningful freedom of association for
working people has required the state to impose restrictions on freedom

39. In their judgment, Health Services and Support Facilities Subsector BargainingAssociation
v British Columbia [2007] 2 SCR 391 at para 70, McLachlin CJ and LeBel J state that Canada's

international obligations can assist courts charged with interpreting Charter guarantees, and they
invoke Dickson CJ's observation in the Alberta Reference that the Charter should be presumed to
provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in the international human rights documents
that Canada has ratified: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR

313 [AlbertaReference]. The former Chief Justice made this observation in the course of a dissenting
judgment in which he relied on Canada's international obligations to support his interpretation of
freedom of association as including the right to strike. In the twenty years since it was written, Dickson
CJ's dissent has taken on iconic status in Canadian labour law and has clearly displaced the majority's
reasoning in the Labour Trilogy as the dominant approach to s 2(d) of the Charter.

40.

Kevin Banks, "The Role and Promise of International Law in Canada's New Labour Law

Constitutionalism" (2012) 16 CLELJ 233 at 271-272.

41.

For a review of the decisions see Judy Fudge, "Freedom of Association" in Stephane Beaulac

& Errol Mendes, eds, CanadianCharterofRights andFreedoms, 5th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2013)
527.
42. Fudge, "The New Discourse of Labour Rights," supra note 36.
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of private parties, employers, either by granting trade unions and their
members immunities from liability (as was the case in the U.K.) or
granting them statutory rights (the approach in Canada).4 Second, labour
rights, unlike other rights, have an inherently collective dimension.4 4
These two features of labour rights cause difficulties for judges when
it comes to interpreting freedom of association under the Charter.Why
should judges tell elected officials that they are under an obligation to
promote the freedoms of one group, workers, over those of another group,
employers? Why should they restrict the freedoms of individuals in order
to support collective action?
Some judges and commentators argue that there is no constitutional
justification for judges to do either of these two things.45 They claim that
as a matter of constitutional interpretation judges should be neutral when
it comes to the treatment of all associations, regardless of whether they are
trade unions, gun clubs, golf clubs, book clubs, or choirs. They have also
argued that judges should not provide greater protection for collectives
than for individuals.
But what does it mean to say that courts should be neutral when it
comes to interpreting the freedom of association in the labour context?46 It
is possible to distinguish between two senses in which the word neutrality
is used. The first sense is the way in which Innis Christie used it in his 1967
book; judges should not let their class biases influence their interpretation
of the common law in order to impose new heads of liability on striking
workers.47 Neutrality is being used to refer to an attitude to judging that
requires adjudicators to treat social activities and actors impartially and
not to impose their own values. It is obvious that judges should be neutral
in this sense.
However, the second sense of neutrality is more controversial.
According to this version, judges should avoid assessing and weighing

43. As Otto Kahn Freund noted, when we talk about freedom of association in the labour relations
context, "we really meantwo different things: the absence of prohibitions or restraints, and the presence
of positive guarantees for its exercise." Cited in Lord Wedderbum, "Freedom of Association or Right
to Organise? The Common Law and International Sources" in Lord Wedderburn, ed, Employment
Rights in Britain and Europe (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991) 142.

44. Regardless of whether or not one regards collective bargaining as vesting only in individuals
or in individuals and groups, it clearly can only be exercised in concert with others. As such, it is
inherently collective. See Fudge, "Brave New Words," supra note 30.
45. See for example, Rothstein J, Ontario (Attorney General)v Fraser,[2011] 2 SCR 3 at paras 165,
184-215; Brian Langille, "The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can
Get out of If' (2009) 54 McGill LJ 177.
46. See, for example, McIntryre J in Alberta Reference, supra note 39 at para 407; Rothstein J in
Fraser,supra note 43 at para 165; Langille, supra note 45; Langille & Oliphant, supra note 7.
47. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort, supra note 1 at 2-3 and 193.
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the respective merits of associational activities and stay above the fray
of identifying social goods. One popular method for avoiding these value
judgments is to define the scope of freedom of association to include
the protection of all activities pursued in association that a person could
lawfully pursue as an individual.48
While this approach is called a "neutral" approach, it is better
understood as equal protection, parallel equality, or a symmetrical
treatment approach.49 The idea is to treat all activities that an individual
can perform lawfully as primafacie protected by the Charter when they
are performed in association. This approach has been praised because it
avoids "gassing around in the abstract about the true meaning of 'freedom
of association' (invoking history, international law, Charter values, and
so on)."5 Another reason offered for taking this tack is that it does not
give groups greater legal protection than individuals. 1 Two of the most
vocal Canadian champions of symmetrical approach, Brian Langille
and Benjamin Oliphant, explicitly argue that courts should not impose
a positive obligation on the state to change the background rules of the
common law that enable employers to dismiss or in other ways penalize
workers who engage in these activities.5 2 They claim that because the
common law applies to everyone equally courts should not interfere
with the background legal rules simply to promote particular interests or
values. 3 Of course, this latter assertion assumes that the common law of
employment is a manifestation of the "virtue" of formal equality and, in
so doing, ignores how master and servant law, which was based on legal
inequality, infused the common law of employment and continues to do

48. Alberta Reference, supra note 39 at para 407; Rothstein J in Fraser, supra note 45, para 165;
Langille, supra note 45.
49. Benjamin Oliphant, "Exiting the Freedom of Association Labyrinth: Resurrecting the Parallel

Liberty Standard under 2(d) & Saving the Freedom to Strike" (2012) 70 U T Fac L Rev 36.
50.
51.

Brian Langille, "What is a Strike?" (2009-2010) 15 CLELJ 355 at 372.
Oliphant, supra note 49; McIntyre, J, Alberta Reference, supra note 39 at para 407.

52.

Brian Langille, "Why the Right-Freedom Distinction Matters to Labour Lawyers," (2011) 34

Dal U 143. In footnote 17 at page 149 of this article, Langille is agnostic on "the basic justification

for this background set of rules," but, instead, "merely appeal[s] to what all lawyers know-that our
rules are ones which we all have equally (i.e. are formally equal in their application). This is their
great strength and, as all labour lawyers know, their weakness as well." In their most recent version
of their "The Legal Structure of Freedom of Association," supra note 7, Langille & Oliphant have

moderated their view about whether, and when, courts should interpret constitutions in order to disrupt
the background rules of the common law. See their discussion at pp 29-31.
53. Langille, supranote 52 at 158.
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so through the duty to obey and the damage limitation rule of reasonable
notice .
Whatkinds ofprotections wouldthis approachto freedom ofassociation
offer in the labour context? Essentially, it would prohibit governments
from directly interfering with employees' freedom to form trade unions,
bargain collectively, and withdraw services (strike). 5 However, it would
leave in place all the common law rules that effectively vitiated freedom
of association, as judges would be under no obligation to put positive
obligations on governments to change these background rules. Legislatures
could revert to the legal order-the common law-that prevailed before
industrial citizenship without being subject to constitutional challenge. 6
Is this approach to the interpretation of freedom of association
conceptually or normatively required as a matter of constitutional

interpretation?

57

While an approach to freedom of association that insists on symmetry
in the treatment of individuals and groups is sufficient for most cases,
for example those involving gun clubs, golf clubs, and choirs, it is of
no use when there is simply no individual analogue to the collective

activity. Sheldon Leader explains, "there are domains of the law which
can impede strikes and seem impervious to the symmetry principle
because they do not recognize an individual right on which that principle

54. Alan Fox, History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the British IndustrialRelations System
(Winchester, Mass: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Mark Freedland, The PersonalEmployment Contract
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
55. Ibidat 163-164.
56. Langille seems to primarily be concerned with state interference with individual freedom.
He is not as concerned with private interference with individual freedom, which requires positive
state obligations, because he accepts the background distribution of common law rules because they
treat every individual equally. The problem with this approach is that it has a very formal (and thin)
conception of equality. See ibid at 163-164.
57. Nor is such a deferential approach required by accepted notions of institutional competency
or legitimacy, although I will leave the institutional discussion to another occasion However, for a
discussion of these issues, see Paul Cavaluzzo, "The Fraser Case: A Wrong Turn in a Fog of Judicial
Deference," in Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, ConstitutionalLabour Rights in Canada:
Farm Workers and the FraserCase (Toronto: Irwin, 2012) 156. Moreover, Langille & Oliphant, supra
note 7 at 20-24, have a very unusual understanding of what constitutional remedies seem to require.
According to their understanding of the requirements of legality, judges who venture to interpret the
constitutional protection of freedom of association so as to require states to enact legislation must
provide what is effectively a complete collective bargaining regime. They seem to ignore how the
proportionality justification in section 1 of the Charterallows courts a great deal of flexibility. They
also seem to be unaware of how courts interpret the Charteroutside of the labour law context. Their
brief discussion of s 15 at pp 25-27 suggests that because they are willing to look at constitutional
interpretation exclusively in the labour law context they are not attentive to the problems of advocating
a purely formal approach to equality, albeit one that would broaden the analogous grounds to include
occupation.
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could gain a purchase."58 For example, an individual employee who
leaves employment without notice will be deemed to have terminated
his contractual relationship. Should workers who collectively withdraw
their labour in order to negotiate better terms also run this risk of having

their employment terminated? Striking workers do not want to be treated
the same as individual employees; what they need is a special liberty
immunizing their concerted action from contractual actions by employers.
In the labour context, it is important to depart from the symmetry principle

if workers are to be entitled to exercise their freedom of association against
the background of common law background rules that render collective
worker action unlawful. Insisting on an individual analogue in order to
protect collective action leads either to ignoring those situations in which
there is no analogy or to constructing bad analogies.59
What about the normative argument in support of the individual
symmetry approach? Why should judges be constrained from requiring
governments to change some of the background common law rules? Here
the question is whether employment is an area in which it is "legitimate
58. Sheldon Leader, "Can You Derive a Right to Strike from the Right to Freedom of Association?"
(2009-2010) 15 Can Lab & Emp U 271 at 281.
59. These bad analogies include the right to strike and the right to play golf (Alberta Reference,
supra note 39, paras 404-405) and the right to collective bargaining with the right to sing in a choir or
to be a member of a book club. In Fraser,supra note 45 at para 184, Rothstein J stated:
there may be qualitative differences between individuals acting alone and individuals
acting in concert. Professor Langille refers to the example of choir singing. See B Langille,
"The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It"
(2009) 54 McGill U 177 at 185. While he ultimately believes that the choir metaphor
should not apply to determine the scope of s 2(d) rights, in my opinion the metaphor is
apt in explaining the limited type of qualitatively different group activities that maybe
protected by s 2(d).
Later in Fraser,supra note 45 at paras 211 and 212, Rothstein J went on to state that
[i]n an article critical of the Health Services decision, Professor Langille describes as
"chilling" the suggestion that the Court should weig[h] the harm of banning book clubs
as compared to banning collective bargaining and relegat[e] the former to a lower level
of concern. Like Professor Langille, I question whether the approach advocated in Health
Services accords with a purposive interpretation of Charter rights. In Health Services,
the majority appeared to be inquiring into the purpose of an activity to see if it merits
constitutional protection This approach requires judges to select among a range of
objects and activities on the basis of their general "importance" to society rather than their
connection to the freedom to associate. It is inappropriate for the Court to engage in this
sort of inquiry in defining the scope of a constitutional right.
These analogies are bad because by abstracting from the social context they obscure power relations
that are historically dependent. It is a style of reasoning that tends to predominate in analytic
philosophy and analytical jurisprudence, and one that is typically closely aligned with positions that
simply uphold the status quo. This type of reasoning appeals to litigators and debaters as it does not
require a deep knowledge of a subject, but rather, the use of rhetorical tropes as persuasive devices.
Political economy and sociological approaches to understanding and justifying laws, such as the type
that appeal to me, tend to avoid decontextualized analogies and argue on the basis of historical and
sociological evidence.
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for the freedom of one group to be used to limit the freedom of another in
order to cope with an imbalance of power"?6"
The answer to this normative question depends upon an assessment
of the evidence of what trade unions do: do they contribute to social
justice or are they simply vehicles for narrow self-interest and rentseeking behaviour? If research and evidence supports the claim that trade
unions promote social justice-for example, advance substantive equality,
promote democracy by representing important perspectives and interests,
and promote compliance with employment and labour law-then this is
a good reason for a liberal state to promote labour rights. While "such
a policy would indeed be non-neutral in its impact on the associational
sphere.., it would not violate the core liberal commitment to neutrality
of justification"61 because it would be promoting the conception of
justice that is at the foundation of a liberal system. Protecting workers'
freedom of association by restricting employers' common law freedoms
does not violate the liberal commitment to neutrality in justification. It
is important for judges to interpret the Charter in accordance with the
values-autonomy, equality, democracy, and dignity-that it is designed
to promote. Although these values may be contentious and difficult to
define, these challenges do not mean that invoking these values to support
a specific interpretation of the freedom of association is simply "gassing
around."
Any interpretation of the freedom of association that brackets out
the common law rules ignores what Innis Christie and other labour law
scholars have so clearly demonstrated-that they interfere with freedom
of association at work.62 A purely negative interpretation of freedom
of association does not address the problem that workers' freedom
of association is undermined by employers' exercise of common law
powers. Civil and political rights do not always need to respect the
boundary rule that they not interfere with competing liberties of others;
in some situations they are allowed to cross that boundary.63 Freedom of
association for working people is precisely such an example. Employment
is a prime example of an area in which it is "legitimate for the freedom
of one group to be used to limit the freedom of another in order to cope
60. Leader, supranote 58 at 285.
61. Stuart White, "Liberal Neutrality and Trade Unions" (2011-2012) 33 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 417
at 423.
62. Christie, supra note 1. Moreover, there are other heads of common law liability that have a

particularly limiting impact of workers collective behaviour, such as inducement of breach of contract
and conspiracy to injure. See AWR Carrothers, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1965).
63. Leader, supranote 58 at 285.
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with an imbalance of power."64 In Canada, the background distribution
of private law rules, which were developed by an appointed judiciary
before the advent of universal suffrage and, therefore, robust democratic
deliberation, interferes with internationally recognized human rights.
Human rights, including the freedom of association and freedom from
discrimination, which are essential to liberal democratic societies, require
the state to interfere with the common law liberties of private actors in
order to protect the human rights of others. Collective bargaining and
human rights legislation, which require positive state action, are necessary
in order to protect human rights.
I have provided a conceptual and normative argument for why it is
important to interpret the freedom of association to protect labour rights.
However, it does not follow that every element of freedom of association
is protected by the constitution. Not only is freedom of association a
composite of three activities-organizing, bargaining, and striking-each
activity has different elements that can be protected in different ways.65
As Leader has noted with respect to strikes, "some elements are securely
anchored in the heart of freedom of association; some parts have a less
direct, means-end link to the entitlement; and some parts stand on their
own, possibly protected by legislation or case law, but unconnected to
the fundamental right of association."" Collective bargaining and labour
relations regimes are complex and changing, and different components
have different degrees of linkage with freedom of association. The tighter
the link that a specific element has to freedom of association, the more
likely that there is a strong case for constitutional protection.
The fact that a court is called upon to make difficult value judgements
when interpreting the constitution in a particular context is not a persuasive
argument for adopting an interpretive approach, such as the "parallel
liberty" approach advocated by Langille and Oliphant, the effect of which
isto avoid making difficult value judgments explicit. The approach they
advocate simply elevates the common law beyond constitutional scrutiny,
and, as a consequence, protects some values (the liberty of employers)
more than others (such as democracy at work or equality). The need for
constitutional protection of labour rights is especially significant when
trade unions are economically and politically weak. It is precisely because
trade unions are weak that they are invoking constitutional protection.

64.

Ibid.

65.

Fudge & Tucker, supra note 15.

66.

Leader, supranote 58 at 275, footnote omitted.
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While it is important to avoid an approach to constitutional interpretation
that simply reifies a particular legislative compromise, which would be the
result of an approach that sought to identify the fundamental elements
of the Canadian model of collective bargaining, this approach is not the
only option. The ILO jurisprudence provides an important normative
resource for interpreting the freedom of association in the labour law
context. Moreover, Banks has helpfully identified some of the Canadian
constitutional structures and doctrines that "provide ways to manage
conflicts between [Canadian] labour laws and ILO jurisprudence."6 In
particular, he identifies the "substantial interference test" advanced in
Health Services, interpreting the common law in accordance with Charter
values, and the proportionality scrutiny under section one as devices
that can be used to tailor the ILO jurisprudence to the Canadian labour
law context.68 Thus, it is possible to design legal tests and remedies that
protect the essential elements of freedom of association and that respect
the institutional legitimacy and competency of the courts.
Conclusion
The challenges facing the labour movement and other civil society
organizations that are concerned with justice and equality in the labour
market are not easy. Constitutional protections for labour rights will
not solve the problem of organized labour's slow decline.69 Nor will
such legal rights revitalize unions' role as key participants in vibrant
social movements. Courts have neither the power nor the authority to
create new institutions or influence economic conditions. However,
constitutional protections could be interpreted by courts in ways that
would give governments a reason to pause and to consider whether there
are less restrictive means of attaining legitimate political objectives than
by interfering with or refusing to protect workers' constitutional rights.
Constitutional review of legislation by judges could legitimately be used
to foster democratic deliberation and to ensure that any restrictions on
labour rights are proportionate to the goals and means that governments
have chosen. It could also be used to ensure that governments live up
to their international human rights commitments to provide freedom of
association for all workers, including those who, like agricultural workers
in Ontario, have historically been excluded from legislative rights at
work. The constitutional protection of freedom of association could, and
should, be used to embed labour markets in an institutional framework that
67.

Banks, supra note 40 at 279.

68.

Ibidat 281-286.

69.

Eric Tucker, "Shall Wagnerism have no Dominion?" (2014) 21 Just Labour 1.
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requires any derogation from the values of democracy and human dignity
to be justified.
While it is legitimate for courts to interpret freedom of association to
protect labour's core rights, there is nothing that requires them to do so.
In the past, as Innis showed, "the trend of judicial creativity in the modem
tort law of industrial conflict" 0 favoured employers. Perhaps now is the
time to right this imbalance, recognize that labour rights are human rights
deserving of constitutional protection, and, in doing so, plant a substantive
notion of equal respect and protection in the common law.

70.

Christie, supra note 1 at 3.

